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Introduction
The appeal of truth commissions is immediate and intuitive: the circle of post-conflict truth and justice can be squared; public 'acknowledgment' of wrong-doing offers an alternative to divisive prosecution; the grip of a conflicted or authoritarian past can be eased from the politics of the present; and all of this can be achieved in a way that generates reconciliation between former adversaries. At least in terms of frequency of 1 Colm Campbell and Catherine Turner, both of the Transitional Justice Institute, University of Ulster (UU) (www.transitionaljustice.ulster.ac.uk). Research for this article was assisted by the award of a Senior Research Fellowship by the Leverhulme Trust to the first named author. An earlier version of this paper was presented at a conference on 'Post-Conflict Truth and Justice in Peru and Northern Ireland', Chatham House, London, 2006. Thanks to Brandon Hamber (UU), Fionnuala Ní Aoláin (UU), Todd Landmann, University of Essex and Christine Bell (UU) for comments on drafts.
3 abuses, by promoting democracy and social healing, and by educating towards a human rights culture are, it is claimed, largely empirically unproven. 6 Others have been primarily concerned to critique the normative frameworks (whether legal or conceptual)
that have dominated debates on post-conflict justice, 7 with a secondary focus on the place of peace in these frameworks.
This article explores skepticisms in relation to aspects of law's role in the aftermath of conflict, including law's relationship to 'reconciliation' and 'truth'. It uses as a case-study the emerging debate on a possible truth commission for Northern Ireland in the wake of the 1998 Good Friday/Belfast [peace] Agreement (the '1998 Agreement'). 8 Part 1 sets out a range of problems associated with the role of law in the aftermath of violent political conflict. This focuses primarily on the invocation both of substantive law and of legal procedure by truth commissions, and proceeds on the assumption that legal dilemmas affecting truth commissions are best understood as a subset of the legal dilemmas of post-conflict justice in general (although this is not to suggest that truth commissions should be understood primarily as legal entities).
This leads to an exploration of law's place in some critiques of the employment of the discourse of post-conflict 'reconciliation'. One aspect that has proved particularly problematic is the formula that has sometimes been adopted of tasking truth commissions Part II grounds the discussion by reference to the Northern Ireland case study. 9 The complexity of the Northern Ireland debate makes it a particularly useful site of exploration. Two sovereign states (the UK and the Republic of Ireland) are centrally involved, both with well-developed (and related) legal systems and legal cultures, and a strong formal commitment to the ideology of 'rule of law'. Both also have extensive (and overlapping) webs of international law commitments (including those arising from membership of the EU and the Council of Europe), with the result that law inescapably forces itself onto the debate in Northern Ireland. Indeed the 1998 Agreement is both a political deal partly concerned with domestic legal change, and an international law treaty (registered with the UN). The quarter century of conflict that preceded the 1998 Agreement saw significant violations by both state and non-state entities, challenging law to provide vehicles to 'capture' both sets of wrongs. That Agreement also employs a somewhat rigid democratic consociational model that has, without a prior reconciliation mechanism, placed former adversaries at the centre of government. Pointedly too, the 1998 Agreement said little about 'the past', yet there exists in many quarters a sense that diverse aspects of that past, involving state and non-state actors, demand attention.
Unsurprisingly therefore, the broader Northern Ireland peace process has seen a host of 5 'piecemeal' (frequently law-based) initiatives in that regard, 10 thereby providing concrete examples for discussion of truth-seeking, and particularly of law's possible contribution.
I. The Trouble with Law?
At least five clusters of doubts congeal around the role of law and legal procedure in the post-conflict environment: the question of what law can "capture" and "see"; dilemmas of peace or justice; the cost of legal procedure; law's contribution to reconciliation; and law's relationship to truth. Most have some relevance to the operation of truth commissions.
What Does Law Capture and See?
As regards the first of these, the most celebrated contribution is Arendt's assertion that Nazi atrocities '…explode the limits of the law, and that is what constitutes their monstrousness. For these crimes no punishment is severe enough.' 11 The result has been to provoke doubt as to whether the criminal process (or perhaps any law-based process)
can, in a meaningful way, frame charges, provide penalties, or make judgments that capture the specific awfulness of mass atrocity. conflict, but of which women bear the brunt. They may take the form of socio-economic exclusion, the violation of the home or even the destruction of the family. These violations, whose impact can be as profound as those of civil and political rights, or of physical violation, often go unnoticed, or at least unmentioned.
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This dominant interpretation of events gradually weaves its way into the narrative of the conflict with the result that when truth commissions are established it appears natural that their focus should be on 'the most serious' violations, a standard set with reference to law. In this way the law has served to delimit what truth commissions will and will not be mandated to investigate, without any appearance of a conscious choice having been made to focus on one set of violations at the expense of another. The broader impact of this when it comes to transition is that it reinforces a particular narrative of the conflict, Although this approach has yet to be adopted elsewhere, dilemmas under this heading have become ingrained in the discourse on truth commissions in general.
The Cost of Legal Procedure
The third area of skepticism has less to do with the legal norms applied, than the process by which that application takes place, though here again claims of law's hegemonic quality also surface. The criticisms here could apply both to common law and civil law systems, but they may have particular salience in relation to a particular device for truth- 
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Those who see ethnic antagonisms as caused by self-interested power-elites, and argue that law's role is to prosecute these 'big fish', typically focus on reconciliation at the higher level of abstraction. Reconciliation is seen as springing from such prosecutions, as each ethnic group comes to realize that it was not an opposing group that was responsible for the violence, but rather the leaders on both sides. In this vein as well, a place is envisaged for 'commission of truth based on popular participation or public gestures of atonement by leaders' 22 . One weakness of these views is that they may downplay latent pre-conflict ethnic antagonism with a rosy view of pre-conflict societal conciliation. It may be more productive to recognize that ethno-national divisions can run very deep, historically, socially and psychologically; that attributing blame to a handful of leaders risks scapegoating; and that if conciliation is to mean not simply a common bond of humanity, but a bond of humanity as part of the same society, re-conciliation at a high level of abstraction is likely to proceed (if at all), only in parallel to a process of conciliation at a lower level.
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Another quandary with reconciliation has to do with the instrumental benefits for which the discourse has been adopted. A critique from some quarters in South Africa is that the concept may have been employed partly to camouflage a deal whereby white elites lost political power but retained economic power, while Black elites gained political power and some economic power, in a process that left much of the black population economically 
Truth, Reconciliation, Hubris and Law
An overlapping problem has to do with the relationship of reconciliation to truth (or truths).
To task a body to produce both truth and reconciliation may risk subordinating truth to the demands of a nebulous concept of reconciliation. This may require the suppression of truths that may be seen to be antipathetic to reconciliation, and the selection and that it may be possible to establish some truths post-conflict, and that such truths may have claims to objectivity (at least that degree of objectivity that attaches to being in accordance with the best available data). Law may be seen as providing a useful reference point in this regard in that it provides pre-existing norms, not specific to particular conflicted societies, around which data can be collected. Truth commissions with a freedom to draw on a wide range of norms, and untrammeled by conventional legal procedure may have some advantages over prosecution.
Further doubts relate to this data, and specifically how (and from whom and by whom) it might be assembled? One critique (largely derived from the South African experience) There may also be a risk that highly ambitious notions of truth commissions as producing An overall judgment on the extent to which the work of the Inquiry illustrates the hegemonic quality of law must await the Inquiry's report. However, differences between the treatment of civilian witnesses and soldiers have raised questions as to the capacity for such public inquiries to act impartially and in such a way as to achieve legitimacy in the eyes of the public. 34 Cost has also been a significant factor in evaluating the work of Given that the Saville Inquiry is focusing on the events of just one day, the costs alone dictate that the public inquiry process does not provide an appropriate model for an overall truth commission.
In view of these these issues and the many dilemmas of law post-conflict canvassed in part 1, there may be a temptation for some policy-makers to seek to abandon law in this context, and to frame a truth commission without legal reference points. This legal 'zero option' invites responses at a number of levels. Pre-existing legal norms would remain in place; and unless legal privilege were extended to those testifying to the commission, such people would risk leaving themselves open to civil or perhaps criminal liability for their contributions. Without this legal protection the commission's capacity to uncover truths about events would be diminished. This capacity would also be diminished were the commission not to have the legal power to compel witnesses and to order the production of documents. Perceptions that a commission was 'toothless' would be likely to damage communal perceptions of its work.
A diminution might also be likely were there not to be some incentivisation for wrongdoers to confess their guilt. The only credible incentive is something along a scale from reduction of sentence to amnesty, the delivery of which would require legal intervention.
A variant of the 'zero option' would be to grant an unconditional blanket amnesty on the calculation that at a stroke, the role of law would be minimized. Such a blanket amnesty would almost certainly be in breach of international law. While it is extremely unlikely 
The Holistic Statistical Approach
If the dilemmas of post-conflict law are inescapable for truth commissions, they need not apply equally to all aspects of the commission's work at all times. The salience of these dilemmas may be being sharpened by an approach that sees the truth commission in a given society as discharging its mandate through one uniform procedure. The salience is likely to be even greater in analyses that fail to take adequate account of the varying imperatives of different post-conflict societies.
It was noted in Part I that many characteristics of the operation of truth commissions owe something to their being seen as an alternative to prosecutions. At a macro level this may 22 result in some form of accountability for the institutions (rather than the individuals) involved in abuses. At a micro level this can help to explain why truth commissions may focus on the forensic truths of particular atrocities (hence the focus on violations of the most important civil and political rights). This kind of micro-forensic, atomized examination is likely to be the most highly legalized, partly because it is intended to perform functions that might otherwise be performed by a criminal trial.
This can be contrasted with an holistic approach, which looks at patterns of violations. If an accurate as possible a picture of violations by the main perpetrating institutions and groups over the span of the conflict can be created, this can contribute to accountability of sorts, albeit that this is unlikely to be at the individual level. 39 The highly legalized atomized approach may have an inherent tendency to seek cases which will support the claim that a violation of a domestic or international legal rule has occurred, arguing that a norm was violated and seeking to support that claim in the strongest possible terms. 40 and allow inference to be generated about the true extent of violations. 54 Similarly, what
Landman describes as "endogenous sources of bias", lying, timidity or political mobilization of testimony, can also be controlled through analysis of reporting densities. 55 A statistical approach can also go some way to ensuring that those political communities that are less well-mobilized and represented have their stories heard.
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It is possible to imagine a truth commission taking this statistical approach as its leitmotiv employing three techniques for data gathering in a way that takes appropriate account of the applicable legal norms (including those of international human rights law and international humanitarian law). 57 The first could involve a set of statistical studies, some based on pre-existing records, some involving fresh data gathering using appropriate 
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On this model the truth commission operates in a way that is complementary to, rather than in substitution for, the work of historians. In its legally mandated power to discover documents and to compel appropriate persons to submit to questioning, the commission could gain access to data that would be beyond the contemporaneous historian's reach. A statistical analysis of patterns of violation would have validity as a reference point for subsequent analysis by historians and others in its own right; documents and testimony made public through the truth commission process could provide historians with primary material; and the Truth Commission would itself provide an object for historians' scrutiny. But claims for an holistic model must also avoid charges of hubris. The point is not that it can paint a picture of violations during conflict that has an absolute 'accuracy';
rather it is that the picture that emerges could make a claim to a greater degree of accuracy and objectivity than that likely to emerge from a highly legalized process.
Normative Frameworks
Because of its multi-layered quality, the holistic statistical model lends itself to analysis humanitarian rules and principles. 65 It would not be legitimate however, for a commission to proceed on the basis that international humanitarian law was at no time applicable to the Northern Ireland conflict.
Imperatives to Prosecute?
The holistic statistical model is not oriented towards individual prosecution. such as to be of major concern to the international community, with the result that two
options may be open to a truth commission. The first is to grant an amnesty for any activity for which full disclosure is made to the commission. The second is to provide a judicial hearing for individuals who make full disclosure, according to a special procedure in which a conviction would be recorded, but with a minimal or non-existent sentence. In either case the rationale would be that the approach was an integrated part of a democratically agreed process that was necessary to promote peace. The first would almost certainly be considered lawful in relation to all crimes other than those (such as torture) for which universal jurisdiction exists. As regards the second, a strong case for lawfulness could be made, even in such extreme cases. However, on a note of caution, it must be acknowledged that even where measures can be deemed to be lawful they may prove to be politically unpopular with one or more powerful constituencies in Northern
Ireland, raising thorny questions of democratic ratification. 
Conclusions: [Re-]Conciliation?
In part 1, concepts of conciliation at two levels of abstraction were set out: the first (highest) level saw conciliation in terms of a bond of common humanity (with reconciliation as the re-creation of that bond); the second saw conciliation in terms of building a shared society. While it could be argued that all post-conflict situations require reconciliation at the higher level of abstraction, conciliation at the lower level is only necessary where former adversaries share the same territory, bringing the issue firmly within the increasingly internationalized frame of contemporary peace processes and peace agreements. The point here is that the process represents a complex attempt at conciliation in this The Northern Ireland case study points to the validity of several of the skepticisms in relation to law's post-conflict role, but it also points to opportunities as well as to threats in relation both to legal procedure and legal norms. As regards procedure, Northern
Ireland warns of the dangers of ceding ownership of the process to legal professionals (in the public inquiry model), but it also points to creative solutions whereby legal procedure might be drawn upon to gain data from otherwise inaccessible sources. 
